## Plan

The United States should establish guaranteed annual military-to-military exchanges with the People’s Republic of China.

## T – 1NC – Incomplete

#### “Economic” and “diplomatic” engagement are highly limited and refer only to use as means of engagement

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.

Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Allowing military or cultural engagement explodes the topic and dilutes effective policy analysis

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’

Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

## T – 2AC

#### 1. We Meet – these are diplomatic exchanges between military personnel

#### 2. They never define “diplomatic” and “economic” – their Resnick evidence only defines engagement and says it includes them – give us a lot of leeway

#### 3. Counter-interpretation: “Diplomacy” is non-violent inter-state communications conducted by officials

Berridge & James 2001 (G.R., Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester; Alan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Keele University, A Dictionary of Diplomacy, p. 62-63)

diplomacy. (1) The conduct of relations between \*sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home or abroad, the latter being either members of their state’s \*diplomatic service or \*temporary diplomats. Thus diplomacy includes the stationing of representatives at \*international organizations. But the backbone of diplomacy has, for five centuries, been the dispatch of \*diplomatic missions to foreign states, and it is still very much the norm. As states are notional rather than flesh-and-blood persons, they cannot communicate in the manner of individuals, but must do so through representative human persons. In principle, this can be done by such individuals speaking to each -other at a distance through electronic devices. But there are large practical objections to their use as the sole or even the prime method of interstate communication. Diplomacy is therefore the principal means by which states communicate with each other, enabling them to have regular and complex relations. It is the communications system of the \*international society. The label ‘diplomacy’ was first given to this system by Edmund Burke in 1796. See also channels of communication. (2) The use of tact in dealing with people. Diplomacy in this sense is a skill which is hugely important in the conduct of diplomacy. But there is a large distinction between an apt way of executing a task, and the underlying function of that task. (3) Any attempt to promote international \*negotiations, whether concerning inter- or intra-state conflicts; hence \*track two diplomacy’. (4) Foreign policy. The use of the word ‘diplomacy’ as a synonym for foreign policy, which is especially common in the United States, can obscure the important distinction between policy and the (non-violent) means by which it is executed.

#### 4. Prefer our interpretation:

#### (a) More predictable – these are professors of international diplomacy defining the term for academic discussions like debate

#### (b) Better ground – our interpretation gets to the core controversy of expanded relations with the PRC – neg gets all disads to new official endorsement of China

#### 5. No limits problem – only official exchanges are topical – and non-violent requirement allows only those military affs where the military is acting as diplomats

#### 6. Independently – military equipment exchanges are “economic.” If we meet “economic” OR “diplomatic,”

**Baldwin** 85 – David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 31

There are, as always, borderline cases that are hard to classify. For example, should the sale or gift of military hardware be considered as economic or military statecraft? In general, the relevant distinction is between firing (or threatening to fire) weapons and selling (or promising to sell) them. Insofar as a market price for such items exists, these transactions could reasonably be labeled economic statecraft. A plausible case could also be made for classifying them as military since some items, e.g. nuclear bombs, may have no "going market price." Also, since providing weapons is so closely related to military statecraft, some might want to treat it as such. Depending on the particular research interest at hand, one might decide to classify them either way. The existence of such borderline cases, however, does not do serious harm to the value of this concept of economic statecraft for most purposes.

#### 7. Reasonability –

#### Our plan sets up a deep substantive debate on a serious proposal for reversing the status quo with new engagement of China – rather than engage that debate, they just want to go for T.

#### Burden of proof – we can only lose on T. They are asking you to intervene in the debate and disqualify us – they need to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

#### No exact definition of engagement – close to the mark is the best you can do – let’s just have a debate!!!!

Capie and Evans 7 — David H. Capie, Research Fellow and Co-Director of the Armed Groups Project in the Centre for International Relations at the University of British Columbia, and Paul M. Evans, Professor at the Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, 2007 (“Engagement,” *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, Published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISBN 9812307230, p. 115-116)

According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the verb to engage have several different meanings. Among these, to engage can mean "to employ busily", "to hold a person's attention", "to bind by a promise (usually a marriage)", or to "come into battle with an enemy". The noun engagement can mean "the act or state of engaging or being engaged", an "appointment with another person", "a betrothal", "an encounter between hostile forces", or "a moral commitment". The gerund engaging means to be "attractive or charming". In the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific, engagement most commonly refers to policies regarding the People's Republic of China. However, the term has been used in many different ways leading to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. A Business Week headline summed up the confusion: "Does 'engagement' mean fight or marry?"1

Although one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is little agreement about the meaning of engagement and considerable inconsistency in its use. The New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of engagement" and described it as a "moving target".2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars and officials to offer their own modified [end page 115] interpretations of engagement, for example deep engagement or conditional engagement. These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual clarity.